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 (ISJ) is devoted to questions of the philos-
ophy and epistemology of information systems (IS) research. Epistemology is the discipline of
questioning the truth claims of science: how and what can we know, and how do the knowledge
claims of science relate to our broader society? The term ‘philosophy’ means that the level of
questioning is not about a particular research method or technique, but includes a self-
reﬂective questioning across other realms of enquiry, ranging from ethics to aesthetics, and
locating our ideas and methods in important trends in the history of philosophy of science.
We are pleased that ISJ is the ﬁrst journal in IS to publish a special issue on such ambitious
topics. Since its beginning, ISJ has been open to a wide variety of research methods, espe-
cially qualitative ones, and a wide variety of approaches, like interpretivism and critical social
theory, that did not always ﬁnd a home in other journals. ISJ has also been open to quantitative
methods and positivist approaches, showing an impressive commitment to pluralism. We see
this special issue as one more way that ISJ serves to link the technical dimensions of IS to
organizational and management issues, including their social and intellectual context.








to illustrate the applicative nature of our ﬁeld, by challenging the classical empiricist view




to explore the extent that our object of research, i.e. the IS, exists independently of our




to question the deﬁnition of science, especially the taken-for-granted ideas of ‘falsiﬁcation’
and ‘paradigms’, through a comparison with other academic ﬁelds.
We received 18 submissions for this special issue. Of those, four were selected by the review
process and are included here. Of the four accepted papers, two responded to the question on
theories (Silva, Butler and Murphy), one to the applicative nature of our ﬁeld (Hassell), and one
to the object of research (Niehaves). But we had no papers that dared to question the deﬁnition
of science through a comparison with other academic disciplines. We will elaborate on this
point in the last part of the editorial, where we will ask if an academic ﬁeld that has such limited
comparative thinking reveals a ‘Peter Pan syndrome’ by failing to grow up. 
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The applicative nature of our ﬁeld: the implementation issue
 
In this issue, the ﬁrst three papers serve to connect questions one and two above. In them, the
authors discuss the applicative nature of our ﬁeld in light of the theories used. Theory is a vivid




 (2004) introduced in 2004 the idea of coding ‘practically
relevant body of knowledge (BoK) in Information Systems that could have major beneﬁts for
the ﬁeld’ (p. 313). Larson & Levine (2005) raised the idea of core areas and discussed the rel-
evance vs. rigor debate. They argued for the necessity of ‘theory building that contributes to a
research tradition’ (p. 367). However, Chen & Hirschheim (2004) questioned such an idea: ‘As
such, if the IS discipline believes that “a monistic, Kuhnian view of IS research is inadequate”,
then a continuous commitment to paradigmatic pluralism is critical’ (p. 225).
The other question, the link to practice, is also often raised in IS research. For instance,
McGrath (2005) estimates that critical research in IS is a case of ‘theory and practice not




 (2001), when they
argued that ‘Many of the “hot issues” in information systems are also “hot issues” in manage-
ment generally, so the impact of IS on practice (and vice versa) is also much more prominent’
(p. 10). In this issue, Butler and Murphy ask about the value of our research if the failure rate





has proved to be largely unsuccessful despite (or because of) the “hype”, and it is no conso-
lation for many to hear from its protagonists that “we’re sorry – we forgot the people”. There
have been many other fads during the 1990s to add to BPR and ERP , including executive infor-
mation systems, group decision support systems, outsourcing, learning organizations and
knowledge management and, of course, electronic commerce and electronic business’ (p. 5).
In this issue, Leiser Silva argues that the reason our research does not improve the imple-
mentation or use of knowledge systems, or any other IS for that matter, is because we do not
understand power. As Hirschheim and Klein say, power has an acceptable side, which is
authority, and a ‘dark side’, which is politics. Mintzberg calls this dark side of power ‘illegitimate
power’. Why is that so? Because politics, says Silva, is a ‘blasphemy in the presence of the
Rational Ideal’ (Keen, 1981, p. 21).
Butler and Murphy argue that we are caught in the ‘trap’ of using ‘information management
tools and concepts to design KM systems’ (McDermott, 1999). We are ‘underpinned by the
image of organizational actors as decision makers governed by bounded rationality’ (Introna,
1997). The paradoxical result says Butler and Murphy, is that, by using a particular kind of ratio-









thereby ‘removing all opportunities for decision making and learning’ (Boland & al., 1994). By
focusing on computerized business processes, we treat as rational what is easy to rationalize,
and focus on the abstract notion of process rather than the concrete reality of human beings.
We use decision theory to avoid deciding what is truly important.
What is the cause of this situation? One origin is in the theory of decision. Indeed, since the
 
bounded rationality theory of decision-making
 
 was presented by Nobel Laureate Herbert
Simon (1977), its inﬂuence in IS has been impressive. Nearly all IS design is governed by the
belief that an ideal of rationality, although bounded, is still achievable. In a world that does not 
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attend to signiﬁcant, overt conﬂict, a decision that satisﬁes the bounded rationality of all is pos-
sible. Even if this decision is not optimal, but simply satisfactory, it is nonetheless rational.
Despite the efforts of Simon in explaining that his theory was not based on substantive ratio-
nality, but on bounded rationality, the point is that the very idea of rationality is never radically
questioned or confronted in practice.
The belief in an ideal, rational decision was ﬁrst described by the French philosopher Des-




, in his book 
 
The Discourse on Method
 
. Over time, the inﬂuence












 was created by the French sociologist, Auguste Comte




. Indeed, Comte was one of the ﬁrst to advocate for
a ‘social physics’, or the study of human society using the methods of the natural sciences, cre-
ating, as Lee (1991) puts it, ‘the natural sciences of social sciences’. Following Comte, another
French sociologist, Emile Durkheim (1968) launched an epistemological movement based on
the assumption that societies may be studied as a whole, without including conﬂicts or the sub-
jectivity of actors. It encouraged us to ‘consider social facts as things’. This epistemological




, and was highly developed in the United States under the inﬂu-
ence of Talcott Parsons (1966).
In this brief overview, rationalism is seen as leading us to believe that an ideal decision is
possible, to believe that physics is a good model for studying human society, and to believe that
we can neglect conﬂicts at a global level. Through the work of Descartes, Comte and
Durkheim, the newborn Social and Human Sciences were under the inﬂuence of a positivism
and a functionalism that turned the identity of the social and the human against itself.
 
The theoretical debate: from sociology to philosophy
 
The history of Social and Human Sciences shows that from the beginning there was a chal-
lenge to the idealistic assumptions of rationalism, positivism and functionalism. As Silva
argues, social reality is the product of its inhabitants. Hence, ‘because of this fundamental dif-
ference in the subject matters of the natural and social sciences, different methods are
required’. Indeed, the positivism of Comte (1995) was systematically criticized by Wilhem









. Functionalism was contested
from the very beginning by another major sociologist, Max Weber (1965). Against Durkheim,
Weber argued that the global level of a society cannot be understood without studying the indi-





The relationship between the global level and the individual level is the basis of nearly all the-
ories in contemporary sociology, especially the four presented in this issue by Leiser Silva:
Habermas’ 
 















. For instance, one application of actor-network
theory to analyse strategy formulation is provided in ISJ by Gao’s (2005) paper. The question
of the global and the individual in contemporary philosophy, as represented in this issue by Tom
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the dynamic relationship between contextual interpretation and psychological interpretation in









’s emphasis on understanding of the individual in its Life World. Such a use of
these reference approach might help to overcome the ‘paradigm wars in organizational studies’
(p. 3) both in IS and sociology, as the sociologist Silverman (1998) argues in ISJ.
 
The object of research: a comparison with physics
 
We now come to the fourth paper in this issue, by Niehaves, which reminds us that the very ﬁrst
epistemological question is not methodology. Instead, it is to wonder about the status of our
object of research: does it exist, or do we invent it? Nearly all major scientists, like Popper,
Piaget, Einstein, Bohr, Heisenberg and Husserl, agree that the most important contribution to
epistemology and philosophy of science is Kant’s 
 
Critique of Pure Reason
 
. Kant led to the
‘Copernician revolution’ in science. This revolution is still now considered as one of the most
important contributions to the philosophy of science, especially in physics. Why? Because he
started by questioning the object of research.
Before Kant, scientiﬁc thinking was based on the assumption that our perception conforms
to the object that we observe. According to Galileo, especially, objects exist in the world inde-
pendently from an observer. This means that the observer can perceive the external object
without any reference to the self who is doing the observation. This was also an assumption
of Newton’s classical physics, before the revolution of contemporary quantum physics. Quoting
Nobel Laureate Heisenberg: ‘In classical physics science started from the belief – or should
one say from the illusion? – that we could describe the world without any reference to our-
selves’ (Heisenberg, 1962, p. 43). Here was the Copernician revolution of Kant’s Critique or
Pure Reason: ‘The Critique is not in error when it teaches us to take the object in two different
senses: as appearances and as thing in itself’ (Kant, 1781, p. 29). Kant thereby establishes a
distinction between two aspects of the objects of our research. We have on the one hand an













. The word phe-




’, meaning appearance. The appearance is
located within our intuition (our mind) and leaves the ‘real’ object or ‘thing in itself’ unknown to
us.
This is the ‘Copernician Revolution’ of Kant. The phenomenon is a ‘being of senses’, and as
an appearance, it stands in opposition to Galileo. According to Kant, ‘things in themselves’ are
unknowable – only a phenomenon is available to our cognition: ‘Our rational cognition applies
only to appearances and leaves the thing in itself uncognized to us’ (Kant, 1781, p. 24). Nobel
Lauriate Niels Bohr put the implication quite starkly: ‘It is impossible to make a clear distinction
between the behavior of the objects and the interaction with measurement instruments that are
used to deﬁne the conditions under which the phenomenon appears’ (Bohr, 1935, p. 207). In
contemporary physics, we are always studying our own measurement instruments and the
artefacts that they bring into appearance. In this sense, in both the natural and the social sci-
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Returning to our central question, ‘does the object of research exist independently from the





what we are talking about is their appearances, which exist not in the world outside but in our
intuition, in our mind: ‘being appearances (phenomenon) cannot exist in themselves, but can
exist only in us’ (p. 94). One of the most well-known phrases of Kant’s ‘Copernician revolution’
is ‘we all cognize a priori about things, what we ourselves put into them’ (p. 23). More radically,
if there is no observer, the phenomenon cannot be, and the object disappears, along with the
intuition of the observer: ‘And if we annul ourselves as subject [. . .] then this entire character
of objects and all their relations [. . .] – would vanish’ (Kant, 1781, p. 94). Contemporary physics
has come to a similar conclusion: ‘Nature is earlier than man, but man is earlier than natural
science’ (Heisenberg, 1962, p. 44). In summary, when we talk about a phenomenon such as
an IS, an organization or a project, the only thing we can be sure about is that this object of
research is in our mind. In both physics and our own corner of the social sciences, objects of
research are in the eyes of the beholder (Monod, 2004).
 
No comparative thinking: the example of physics
 
What is the situation in IS? Even if ‘It has commonly been argued that the use of different
research methods within the information system discipline and within individual pieces of
research will produce richer and more reliable results  .  .  .  such work is relatively scarce’
(Mingers, 2003). As Butler and Murphy remind us in this issue, ‘(the) positivist inﬂuence of com-
puter science and mathematics, resulted in a chieﬂy functionalist orientation’ (Hirschheim &
Klein, 1989). This trend is conﬁrmed in the 2004 paper published in ISJ by Chen and Hir-
schheim: ‘positivist research still dominates 81% of published empirical research. In particular,
US journals, as opposed to European journals, tend to be more positivist, quantitative, cross-
sectional and survey oriented’ (p. 197). By doing so, aren’t we trying to adopt ‘distant methods’
relying on questionnaires in order to avoid ‘intervention in the research context’ that would
allow us a more ‘engaged data-gathering method’ (Nandhakumar & Jones, 1997, p. 109)? Are
we not still fascinated by mathematics, and the archetypal science in IS remains physics? This
is why we are advocating for a wider comparison with other sciences, from within the Social
and Human Sciences, but also from within the ‘hard sciences’ like physics. Popular belief holds












 is the belief
in determination: in order to describe a phenomenon we must rely on the analysis of causes.
This principle of causality leads to the explanation of a phenomenon, i.e. its prediction with
certainty.




, the belief in the existence of an external reality that
we can describe directly, without any reference to the observer. This means that there is one
and only one single description of a phenomenon and that this description corresponds to the







We use ‘phenomenons’, despite the fact that one of the guest editor of this Special Issue is expected to follow the French
Academy’s recommendation to use ‘phenomena’. 
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the world and the self, between the object and the subject, between objectivity and subjectivity.
This was indeed the case of physics in the nineteenth century, during the physics of Newton
and Galileo. But this is no longer the truth and has now been replaced by contemporary phys-
ics, primarily ‘Quantum Physics’. As Einstein wrote: ‘It is not likely that a future knowledge
might constrain physics to leave its present day theoretical foundations, of statistical nature, in
favour of deterministic foundations, that would deal directly with physical reality’ (Einstein,




’ of the ‘
 
present day theoretical foundations
 
’ of physics is the
end of determinism, or causality. And the fact that we cannot ‘
 
deal directly with physical reality
 
’
is the end of objectivity.

















. Before contemporary physics, we
thought we could explain the trajectory of an object by knowing the forces that were applied to
it, with forces being the causes of its movement. In order to do so, we need to know everything
about the object, including its position and its speed at every moment. This totally changed with
contemporary physics, and we now realize that the more accurately we know an object’s posi-





 by the Nobel Laureate Heisenberg, and marked the end of determinism as well
as the end of causality.




, recall that there were only two kinds of objects in the world of clas-
sical physics, matter and energy. The fact that an object was matter or energy was independent
from the observer, and belonged to the thing in itself. Nothing in the world could, at the same
time, be both matter and energy. This belief was shattered by new understandings of the famil-
iar object, light. In contemporary physics, light is at the same time both matter and energy. It
depends on the point of view of the observer. If you observe it with some devices, you can
describe it as a wave, which is energy. But if you observe light with other devices, it appears
as a photon, which is matter. This was called the duality of light, or the duality wave-particle,




 proposed by another Nobel Laureate, Niels
Bohr, who himself relied on, bringing this argument full circle, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.
In physics, this signalled the end of objectivity, and established that there are different, legit-
imate points of view on the same object. As Heisenberg said in reference to physics, ‘we can-
not escape interpretation’. We have to choose our point of view, and in so doing, we exercise
our subjectivity. What is therefore the criteria of truth, as Niehaves asks in this issue? It is not
an objective correspondence with the object, but a consensus about the object. Indeed, some-
thing is said to be true in physics when different research teams around the world make similar







Conclusion: a ‘Peter Pan syndrome’ in IS?
 
The four papers of this issue can be said to argue that we produce knowledge in IS that does
not solve practical problems, because we try to know everything about nothing. Our discipline’s
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own involvement in bringing forth our research object, and our own limitations in what we can
know. By relying on causality and objectivity, two concepts challenged by contemporary phys-
ics, we leave ourselves little hope of making Social and Human Science progress. But is there
a viable alternative to the assumption that we are rational? Can we seriously assume that we
are irrational? No. There is an alternative to rationality, but it is not found in the negation of ratio-
nality. It is found by stepping aside from the hope for rationality, and by accepting ourselves as

















, which are the context and the meaning
of an action in a given society. As Lew Hassell argues in this issue, we can only understand
knowledge if we consider it as situated, embodied and linked to experience in the Life World,
to culture, and to power. Without this Social and Human Science conceptualization of knowl-
edge, how could we ever dream of a successful implementation of a KMS? This is precisely
the purpose behind sociological theories like Habermas’ theory of communicative action,
Giddens’s structuration theory, Latour’s actor-network theory, or Foucault’s circuits of power,
and behind philosophical approaches like hermeneutics and phenomenology.
More broadly, what is the consequence of the Principle of Complementarity for the Social
and Human Sciences? Ultimately, it questions the possibility of falsiﬁcation. This theory of truth
was developed by Popper (1972), and claims that a hypothesis can never be proven. Falsiﬁ-
cation holds that a hypothesis can only be not-yet-unconﬁrmed (inﬁrmed), and it has become
a core assumption of empiricism. In place of this criterion of truth, contemporary physics invites
us to try and employ the Principle of Complementarity, which suggests that for every object, we
should always have multiple points of view. The criteria of truth then becomes whether or not
several points of view arrive at the same result, or at least at consistent results.
What would this mean in IS? It would mean a realization that the other sciences can help us.
They can help us to have multiple points of view on our object, including its appearances. About
the single object, knowledge, this issue presents two points of view on implementation – one
sociological and one philosophical. The two are not ﬁghting to defeat each other, but are avail-
able to us as compliments to each other. All sciences, including our own, evolve, and the com-
plimentary nature of the multiple perspectives that epistemology and philosophy can make
available across disciplines is a powerful antidote to the positivist, especially functionalist and
rationalist, history we still carry forwards in our IS journals and our IS research.
It is time for IS to stop repeating its history and that of classical physics. To repeat that history
is to continue reproducing the mistakes of others. Unless we break from our history, we will not
grow as a discipline. Instead, we will remain trapped in using an economics without a sociology,
and a sociology inspired by an out-of-date physics. Our growth as a discipline requires that we
simultaneously embrace multiple alternatives from the broader sciences, and struggle with the
problem of reasonableness, rather than the impossibility of ideal decisions and rationality. In
the conclusion of their ‘paradigmatic and methodological examination of IS research from 1991
to 2001’, Chen and Hirschheim asked the question ‘We are not sure whether the ﬁeld considers
itself too young to need such a reﬂection or whether there simply are not enough “old timers”
around who could provide such a view. Whatever the case, we believe this to be a serious
shortcoming of the IS discipline’. In psychology, the syndrome of refusing to grow has a name 
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. It applies to thousands of adults who refuse to take responsibility
for their own future and have not developed into a fully formed, complex adult (Kiley, 1983).





 based on Nobel Laureate Gunter Grass’ novel (1990). If we refuse to compare ourselves
critically, yet constructively to other sciences, aren’t we suffering from the Peter Pan syndrome?
Can we afford the luxury of this chronic adolescence?
We would like to thank John Artz, Laurence Brooks, Deborah Bunker, Andrew Burton-Jones,
Jim Courtney, Wendy Currie, Anita Greenhill, Jonny Holstrom, Juhani Iivari, Lucas Introna,
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eyer and Edgar Whitley for their outstanding reviewing work.
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